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any economic data series are revised as more comprehensive
information becomes available and as methodologies
improve. Even the latest available data are subject to uncer-
tainty, and at some point historical data may be replaced by more
accurately measured observations. Because monetary policy decisions
are made with an eye to the state of the economy, data uncertainty com-
plicates the evaluation and conduct of monetary policy. 
Revisions to data series complicate the evaluation of historical policy
actions. Policy actions taken based on data available at the time may
differ considerably from recommendations based on revised data
(Orphanides 2001). Policy settings that seemed appropriate when they
were made may be regarded as mistakes when viewed with the revised
data. Thus, to understand the policy concerns of the past, it is important
to know the data policymakers were observing at the time (Runkle;
Croushore and Stark 2000). 
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Editor's Note:  Earlier versions of this article that appeared on this website contained
editorial errors.  This version, like the one published in the ﬁrst quarter 2004 Economic
Review, is correct.A related consequence of data revisions is that policymakers today
must make decisions based on data that they know are noisy or impre-
cise measures of activity. Since different data series are revised to
different extents, knowing the justiﬁcation and properties of historical
revisions can help policymakers distinguish important economic signals
in data ﬂuctuations from noise. Data subject to smaller revisions might
be regarded as less noisy and more reliable. Consequently, when making
decisions policymakers might choose to put more weight on such series. 
This article focuses on revisions to data that policymakers often
examine when assessing monetary policy options. While other studies
have looked at the impact of data revisions on monetary policy, this
article is the ﬁrst to examine the policy implications of revisions in two
widely used benchmarks of resource utilization—the Congressional
Budget Ofﬁce (CBO) estimates of potential output and the natural rate
of unemployment. The article is also the ﬁrst to consider how data revi-
sions affect policy decisions through changes in estimates of the
equilibrium real rate of interest. 
The article ﬁnds that revisions to data can lead to policy regret—
instances when revised data may suggest alternative actions would have
been preferable to those taken. Based on this ﬁnding and analysis in
other studies, the article recommends making policy less sensitive to
economic indicators that are subject to large revisions. The ﬁrst section
of the article addresses what data revisions are relevant for monetary
policymakers. The second section reviews the timing and magnitude of
historical revisions to a key set of policy-relevant indicators. The third
section illustrates how data revisions complicate the evaluation and
conduct of monetary policy. The fourth section reviews the strengths
and weaknesses of proposals on how to minimize the complications of
data revisions when setting monetary policy. 
I. WHAT REVISIONS MATTER FOR POLICY? 
Most macroeconomic data series are revised. Although ﬁnancial
data, such as bilateral exchange rates and security prices, generally are not
revised, measures of real economic activity and aggregate prices typically
6 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYare. This article analyzes measurements of activity and inﬂation that are
representative of the economic variables typically encountered in studies
on the conduct of monetary policy.
The choice of series is motivated by recent literature drawing on
Taylor (1993) that uses policy rules to recommend a target level for the
federal funds rate based on the equilibrium real interest rate, a measure
of economic activity, and the deviation of inﬂation from the policymak-
ers’ inﬂation goal.
1 Such policy rules are convenient for highlighting the
implications of data uncertainty but do not capture the complications
of the actual policymaking process. Nevertheless, as argued by Taylor
(1993) and Svensson, the rules may provide useful benchmarks for
thinking about policy in a complex world. 
In the framework for monetary policy just described, two types of
revisions are important: (1) revisions to “observable” data series, and (2)
revisions to estimates of economic concepts made as a consequence of
revisions to data, the availability of additional data, or modiﬁcations to
economic theories. Although analysts tend to think of the latest avail-
able data as the truth, in reality, these data are estimates of the true
measure of the underlying concept. Many data reporting agencies
provide revised estimates of the data series as they obtain more complete
source data and improve their techniques to construct the data. Earlier
releases of data series thus may be considered noisy or uncertain when
compared with the later releases. 
In addition, some economic concepts—such as potential output,
the natural rate of unemployment, or the equilibrium real rate—are not
directly measured but play an important role in the monetary policy
process. Estimates of these unobserved economic variables are con-
structed based on economic theory and published data.
2 Revisions to
published data generally lead to revised estimates of the economic con-
cepts. However, revisions also may occur as more recent data become
available or in response to new theoretical developments. 
This article will consider both types of revisions. Observed data
series that will be examined include real gross domestic product (GDP),
GDP price index inﬂation, Consumer Price Index (CPI) inﬂation, and
the unemployment rate.
3 Estimates of other economic concepts that
will be examined include the natural rate of unemployment, potential
output, and the equilibrium real interest rate. As revisions to both
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observable data and estimates of economic concepts can affect policy-
rule recommendations, revisions to either are important for the
evaluation and conduct of monetary policy. 
II. HOW LARGE ARE DATA REVISIONS?
To assess the magnitude of revisions that policymakers must face,
this section compares different versions of data series. Because data are
revised, multiple versions of the historical evolution of an economic
variable exist. Careful labeling is needed to track these different versions
of history. Thus, this section starts with an introduction to terminology
before proceeding to an analysis of the magnitude of revisions. 
What does “vintage” mean?
Discussions of data revisions are often awkward because, when data
are subject to revisions, multiple versions of each observation of an eco-
nomic variable exist. The term vintage is used to distinguish between
different versions of the same data. In particular, the vintage of a data
series refers to the date when that version of the data became available.
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Because it will be revised, the latest available vintage of a data series
(2003Q1-vintage data for the purposes of this article) does not accu-
rately represent the information available to policymakers historically.
5
To accurately assess information available to policymakers when they
made their decisions, that is, in real time, it is important to use the vin-
tages of data to which they had access. Thus, decisions made in the
fourth quarter of 1994, for example, should be assumed to depend on
1994Q4-vintage data, while decisions made in the ﬁrst quarter of 2003
should depend on 2003Q1-vintage data.
This article focuses on 13 different vintages of data: the ﬁrst quar-
ters of 1991 through 2003.
6 These vintages reﬂect revisions of potential
output and the natural rate of unemployment made by the Congres-
sional Budget Ofﬁce (CBO). With the exception of the equilibrium real
rate, remaining data were obtained from the Real-Time Dataset for
Macroeconomists available from the website of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia.
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The period to be examined covers the fourth quarter of 1987
through the end of 2001. This sample was chosen because it starts with
the appointment of Alan Greenspan as chairman of the Federal Reserve
and extends through the last observation for which at least two vintages
of data are available. By limiting the sample to a period during which a
single person was chairperson of the Federal Reserve, regime change
and its effects on the speciﬁcation of the policy rule are less likely to
complicate the analysis.
8 However, extending the sample further back
would not qualitatively change the results as no additional vintages of
data are available. The sample is sufﬁciently long to include periods
with very different economic experiences, including the 1987 stock
market crash, the 1990-91 recession and subsequent recovery, the
expansion from 1991-2001 (the longest expansion since 1854), fallout
from the 1997 Asian crisis, the NASDAQ correction that started in
2000, and the 2001 recession.
Table 1
A SUMMARY OF THE TIMING AND REASONS 
FOR DATA REVISIONS
Data Series Timing of Revisions Reason for Revisions
(Reporting Agency)
to correct reporting errors or
software errors 
seasonal adjustment factors
are revised with the availabil-
ity of additional data
occasional
for 5 years after initial
release
Consumer price index
(Bureau of Labor Statistics)
with changes in census popu-
lation (usually, but not
always, associated with the
decennial census)
seasonal adjustment factors are
revised with the availability of
additional data
occasional
for 5 years after initial
release
Unemployment rate
(Bureau of Labor Statistics)
more complete information
more complete information
better, less timely informa-
tion becomes available
new source data, possible
changes in deﬁnitions of
variables or in methodology
1 month after initial
(advance) release
2 months after initial release
every July the prior 3 years
of data are revised
all historical data are revised
every 5 years or so (bench-
mark revisions)
National Income and 
Product Accounts Data—
includes real GDP and the
GDP price index
(Bureau of Economic 
Analysis)10 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Measures of economic activity 
The discussion in this article focuses on three measures of economic
activity frequently used in policy rules: the output gap, the unemploy-
ment gap, and the deviation of real GDP growth from potential
growth.
The output gap. In the policy rule popularized by Taylor (1993),
economic activity is typically measured using the output gap, deﬁned as
the percent difference between real GDP and potential GDP.
9 Estimates
of the output gap are revised with revisions to real GDP, potential GDP,
or both and historically have been sizable.
10 Real GDP data are subject
to an ongoing process of revision reﬂecting more complete information,
new source data, changes in deﬁnitions of variables, and changes in
methodology (Table 1). Potential GDP is not directly observable and
must be estimated. This article examines the properties of CBO esti-
mates of potential GDP. CBO estimates of potential GDP may be
revised, for example, as economic data are revised, as new observations




A VINTAGE COMPARISON OF THE AVERAGE 
OVER 1987Q4 THROUGH 1990Q4
Measures of Activity Inﬂation Eq real
rate
1991 .42 5.46 5.46 .00 2.22 2.60 -.38 3.71 4.82 3.32
1992 .07 5.46 5.62 -.16 1.93 2.66 -.73 4.06 4.82 2.69
1993 .10 5.46 5.62 -.16 1.80 2.40 -.60 4.22 4.82 2.69
1994 -.20 5.46 5.62 -.16 2.01 2.56 -.55 4.21 4.82 2.56
1995 .25 5.46 5.95 -.49 2.01 2.60 -.59 4.21 4.84 2.65
1996 .01 5.46 5.95 -.49 2.17 2.67 -.50 4.04 4.84 2.55
1997 .35 5.48 5.96 -.48 2.17 2.56 -.39 4.07 4.84 2.94
1998 .71 5.48 5.96 -.48 2.16 2.50 -.34 4.07 4.84 3.29
1999 .67 5.48 5.91 -.43 2.16 2.56 -.40 4.07 4.84 3.43
2000 .46 5.48 5.90 -.42 2.59 3.00 -.41 3.69 4.84 3.55
2001 .41 5.48 5.90 -.42 2.58 2.94 -.36 3.69 4.84 3.18
2002 .48 5.48 5.90 -.42 2.58 2.91 -.33 3.69 4.84 2.90
























vintageECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2004 11
Table 2 shows the average of the series over 1987Q4 through
1990Q4 for each of the data vintages. This subsample was chosen
because it is the longest subsample for which data are available for all 13
vintages. Differences in the average across vintages signal large or per-
sistent data revisions. By using a multiyear sample, revisions that reﬂect,
for example, a shifting of the timing of activity between quarters will be
averaged out and revisions that predominantly affect a single quarter
will be down-weighted. 
The average view of the state of the economy in 1987Q4 through
1990Q4 changed substantially over time as data were revised. In 1994,
a retrospective view of this period suggests that on average real GDP
was below potential, but by 1998 revisions changed the view of history
such that on average real GDP exceeded potential by about 0.7 percent.
A second method to assess the magnitude of revisions is to examine
the range across vintages of reported values for each quarter. In general,
when comparing revisions to different data series, the series with the
larger range across vintages will be the series subject to larger revisions and
to more measurement uncertainty. Chart 1 shows a band that spans the
13 vintages of estimates of the output gap with a solid line showing the
output gap according to the latest available vintage of data. The band
Chart 1
RANGE OF OUTPUT GAPS ACROSS VINTAGES
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narrows for more recent time periods because, starting in 1991Q4, one
less vintage of data is included in the range every four quarters. Thus, for
example, over 1991Q4 through 1992Q4, 12 vintages are available, over
1997Q4 through 1998Q4 only six vintages are available, and over
2001Q4 through 2002Q4 only a single vintage is available. 
Table 3 provides some summary statistics on the historical range
covered by the available data vintages.
12 In each quarter, the range across
vintages of the output gap is the height of the shaded area in Chart 1—
the difference between the maximum across vintages of the reported
value for that quarter and the minimum. This approach to evaluating
the size of revisions conﬁrms and strengthens the ﬁndings from Table 2.
In particular, revisions to estimates of the output gap have been very
large. Depending on the vintage of data available, CBO estimates of the
output gap differed by as much as 2.39 percentage points.
Table 3
THE RANGE OF DATA ACROSS VINTAGES
Average Minimum Maximum
Economic Activity
Output Gap 1.34 .03 2.39
Unemployment Gap .38 .00 .69
Unemployment rate .06 .00 .23
NAIRU .56 .48 .62
Real GDP growth –
Potential GDP growth (4-quarter) .86 .01 2.00
Real GDP growth –
Potential GDP growth (1-quarter AR) 1.61 .62 3.27
Real GDP growth (1-quarter AR) 1.54 .48 3.35
Potential GDP growth (1-quarter AR) 1.29 .52 3.04
Nominal GDP growth (1-quarter AR) 1.39 .45 3.00
Inﬂation
GDP price inﬂation (4-quarter) .44 .04 .88
GDP price inﬂation (1-quarter) .71 .04 1.76
CPI inﬂation (4-quarter AR) .04 .00 .11
CPI inﬂation (1-quarter AR) .31 .00 .93
Equilibrium real rate
Equilibrium real rate 1.34 .27 2.05
Note: Results are over 1987Q4 – 2001Q4. 4-quarter denotes growth rates over the previous four
quarters; 1-quarter AR denotes growth over the previous quarter expressed at an annual rate.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2004 13
Although large, the range in Chart 1 and the summary statistics in
Tables 2 and 3 may considerably understate uncertainty in the output
gap since they reﬂect relatively recent experience. The chart only shows
revisions to data starting in the fourth quarter of 1987 and for vintages
starting in 1991. Orphanides (2003) found revisions as large as about
ten percentage points to estimates of the output gap in the 1970s when
comparing real-time data with 1994-vintage data.
13
The unemployment gap. The unemployment gap, deﬁned as the dif-
ference between the unemployment rate and the natural rate of
unemployment, is an alternative measure of economic activity that
appears in some policy rule speciﬁcations. The notion of the natural
rate of unemployment examined in this article is the rate of unemploy-
ment that is consistent with stable inﬂation. It is often referred to as the
nonaccelerating inﬂation rate of unemployment (NAIRU).
Revisions to either the unemployment rate or to estimates of the
NAIRU lead to revisions in the unemployment gap. This is important
because, although revisions to the unemployment rate are very small,
the same is not the case for estimates of the NAIRU.
14 The average
CBO NAIRU estimate over 1987Q4 through 1990Q4 differed by as
much as almost 0.5 percentage point and ranged from a low of 5.46 for
1991 vintage data to a high of 5.96 for 1997 and 1998 vintages of data
(Table 2). The unemployment gap inherits the uncertainty that accom-
panies NAIRU revisions (Table 3). Nevertheless, uncertainty about the
unemployment gap is considerably smaller than uncertainty about the
output gap.
Real GDP growth less potential growth. A third measure of economic
activity that may be used in policy rules is the deviation of real GDP
growth from potential growth.
15 This measure of activity is revised with
revisions to either real GDP growth or to potential growth. The largest
revisions to average real GDP growth rates shown in Table 2 primarily
reﬂect the effects of benchmark revisions that occurred in 1991, 1995,
and 1999. In the table, benchmark revisions contribute to the large jumps
between average growth rates that occur between the 1991 and 1992 vin-
tages, the 1995 and 1996 vintages, and the 1999 and 2000 vintages.
16
When benchmark revisions lead to large changes in real GDP data
over multiple quarters or years, estimates of potential output also tend to
be revised in the same direction. Moreover, the effect of data revisions on14 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
the deviation between the two is attenuated. As shown in Table 2, the
average potential GDP growth rate over 1987Q4 through 1990Q4 was
revised up by about 0.4 percentage point between 1999 and 2000. This
coincided with the benchmark revision to NIPA data that led to an
increase in average real GDP growth of about 0.4 percentage point. The
largest difference between average real GDP growth rates is 0.79 percent,
obtained comparing the 1993 and 2000 vintages of data. The largest dif-
ference between average potential growth rates is 0.60 percent, also
obtained by comparing the 1993 and 2000 vintages of data. However,
the difference between the deviations of real GDP growth from potential
growth is only 0.19 percent, when comparing the same two vintages of
data—and the minimum difference across vintages is only 0.41 percent,
obtained comparing 1992 with 2003 vintage data. 
Revisions to one-quarter growth rates (annualized) of real GDP and
potential output and the difference between the two growth rates are
quite large. This is particularly true when the revisions are compared
with revisions to the unemployment rate, the NAIRU, and the unem-
ployment gap (Table 3).
17 However, since real GDP growth can be quite
volatile from quarter to quarter, when used as a measure of economic
activity in a policy rule, growth rates are usually calculated over four
quarters. This is the same convention typically used for inﬂation (Taylor
1993). While the motivation for this practice is to reduce quarter-to-
quarter variation in the inputs to the policy rule and the consequent
policy recommendation, this practice also reduces data uncertainty
associated with revisions.
Measures of inﬂation 
Revisions to two measures of inﬂation are examined. Although revi-
sions to GDP price inﬂation are larger than those to CPI inﬂation, the
latter is not necessarily subject to less uncertainty. Overall, revisions to
inﬂation, particularly when inﬂation is measured over four quarters, are
relatively small compared with revisions to the output gap or the devia-
tion of real GDP growth from potential.
GDP price inﬂation.The GDP price index is one of the series in the
NIPA data.
18 Consequently, GDP price inﬂation is revised on the same
timetable as the real GDP data (Table 1).
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band that envelops all 13 vintages of GDP price inﬂation. The upper
border of the band in each quarter is deﬁned by the maximum across all
vintages of GDP price inﬂation for that quarter (annual rate) with the
lower border deﬁned by the minimum. For reference, GDP price inﬂa-
tion as reported in the latest available vintage of data is superimposed
on the band.
On average, revisions to GDP price inﬂation are of comparable mag-
nitude, but in the opposite direction of revisions to real GDP growth
(Table 2). However, statistics on the range across vintages of reported
GDP price inﬂation rates suggest these revisions are not as large as those
to real GDP growth or the output gap (Table 3). In addition, the impli-
cations of revisions to GDP price inﬂation for policy are reduced further
by the common practice of using inﬂation measured over four quarters
rather than over one quarter in implementing policy rules.
CPI inﬂation. For analyzing general price trends in the economy,
the seasonally adjusted CPI is usually preferred over the nonseasonally
adjusted CPI. Revisions to these data may reﬂect corrections to the
underlying nonseasonally adjusted data as well as updated seasonal
adjustment factors (Table 1). 
Chart 2
RANGE OF GDP PRICE INFLATION ACROSS VINTAGES
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Percent
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Since revisions to the CPI are largely conﬁned to seasonal factors,
they tend to average to zero over a year.
20 As seen in Table 2, unlike the
case for GDP price inﬂation, the mean CPI inﬂation rate is almost the
same across all vintages. In addition to being small on average, the
divergence across vintages of CPI inﬂation is much smaller than the
vintage differences for GDP price inﬂation (Table 3). 
Observations of the CPI inﬂation rate may not be directly compa-
rable over time. Unfortunately, with the exception of changes due to
new seasonal factors, historical CPI data are largely unrevised when the
methodology used to construct the CPI is revised.
21 New observations
may be generated using a new methodology, but historical observations
are left unchanged. 
In the 1990s, existence of a likely positive bias in reported CPI inﬂa-
tion rates received considerable attention, and the BLS undertook several
changes to reduce the size of the bias. Thus, the reported CPI inﬂation
rate could have suggested a decline in inﬂation, when all that was really
happening was an improvement in data construction techniques. To
account for such methodological changes, policymakers might want to
adjust the implicit target for inﬂation, or allow their implicit deﬁnition
of the price stability goal to change with methodological adjustments.
Recent BLS research has found that the measured rate of inﬂation
would have been 0.45 percentage point lower on average between 1978
and 1998 if methods used in calculating the CPI at the end the end of
the period had been in place over the entire period (Stewart and Reed).
However, since a series of changes were implemented over that period,
the yearly differences between the CPI and the 1998-method CPI (the
so-called Consumer Price Index research series) varied considerably
around the 0.45 percentage point mean.
The equilibrium real rate
The equilibrium real rate, or natural rate of interest, is the real inter-
est rate consistent with a stable rate of inﬂation and with output equal to
its potential. As was the case for the NAIRU and potential GDP, the
equilibrium real rate is a concept that is estimated, not observed. This
analysis uses real-time, time-varying estimates of the equilibrium real rate
following a procedure similar to that of Laubach and Williams. DetailsECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2004 17
of the estimation procedure are provided in the appendix. Since the esti-
mation procedure is held constant across vintages of data, revisions to
estimates of the equilibrium real rate reﬂect revisions to data series used
by the estimation procedure and the availability of additional observa-
tions in later vintage data.
22 In general, the availability of additional
observations tends to be the larger contributing factor to revisions to esti-
mates of the time-varying equilibrium real rate.
Revisions to estimates of the equilibrium real rate can be quite large.
The average level of the estimated equilibrium real rate from 1987Q4 to
1990Q4 varies between 2.55 percent and 3.32 percent across the 13 vin-
tages (Table 2). Estimates of the equilibrium real rate for the 13 vintages
of data lie within the shaded band shown in Chart 3, with the solid line
showing the estimate based on latest available data. The range of esti-
mates is comparable to that for the CBO output gap (Table 3). 
Since policy rule recommendations move one-for-one with the equi-
librium real rate, large revisions in estimates of the equilibrium real rate
imply large changes in policy rule characterizations of appropriate mone-
tary policy. Compared with typical policy actions taken at Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) meetings—usually 0.25 to 0.50 percentage
point—the average range of 1.34 percentage points is very large.
Chart 3
RANGE OF EQUILIBRIUM REAL RATES ACROSS VINTAGES
Source: Author's calculations
Percent
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III. WHAT DO DATA REVISIONS IMPLY FOR POLICY? A
POLICY RULE VIEW 
This section examines how data revisions affect monetary policy
decisions. The framework for the discussion is a policy rule in the spirit
of Taylor (1993). The policy rule provides a recommendation for the
target level of the federal funds rate (funds rate) based on an estimate of
the equilibrium real rate (eq real rate), the level of economic activity
(activity), and the deviation of inﬂation (inﬂation) from the policymak-
ers’ inﬂation target (target):
23
(1)
According to this rule, to slow economic activity or reduce inﬂa-
tion, policymakers should set the federal funds rate at a level that
exceeds a reference value equal to the sum of the equilibrium real rate
and inﬂation. To stimulate economic activity, policymakers should set
the federal funds rate below the reference value. 
The data revisions discussed in the previous section matter because
they complicate the evaluation of historical policy actions and the
conduct of policy. A quick glance at the ranges summarized in Table 3
reveals that measures of economic activity and the equilibrium real rate
are subject to considerable uncertainty. Thus, rule recommendations for
the funds rate in a given quarter will likely differ considerably depend-
ing on the vintage of data used.
Why does it matter that rule recommendations are sensitive 
to data vintage?
Chart 4 provides an example of how vintage effects can lead to
divergent policy recommendations. Recommendations in the chart use
the output gap to measure economic activity, use GDP price inﬂation
over the previous four quarters to measure inﬂation, and assume Taylor’s
original setting of 2 for the inﬂation target.
24The range shows how much
the recommendations vary across the various vintages of estimates of the
equilibrium real rate, GDP price inﬂation, and the output gap. 
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The shaded band in Chart 4 helps illustrate how data revisions
complicate the evaluation of historical policy actions. Policy rule recom-
mendations based on latest available data are often used as a metric for
determining whether past policy actions were mistakes. One interpreta-
tion of the band is that it covers the range of policy recommendations
that ex post evaluations of economic conditions could have justiﬁed
assuming policy had been set according to this version of the original
Taylor rule. The width of the band signals the likelihood of policy
regret—the degree to which a policy action, viewed as appropriate given
real-time information, may appear to be too accommodative or too
restrictive when evaluated based on subsequently revised data. The larger
the band, the more disappointing a revisionist view of historical policy
decisions might be. For example, performing a similar exercise for an
earlier period, Orphanides (2003) attributed the Great Inﬂation of the
1970s to real-time mismeasurement of potential GDP in the context of
activist monetary policy such as recommended by a Taylor rule. 
Chart 4
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In addition, data revisions complicate the conduct of policy. The
band may be seen as representing uncertainty associated exclusively
with data revisions about what the Taylor rule would recommend for
policy. A wider band signiﬁes that historically the data on which the
policy recommendation is based have been subject to larger revisions.
Since large revisions may indicate that future revisions to current data
will also be large, the width of the band reﬂects the degree of noise in
the data relative to the underlying economic signal and thus represents
uncertainty associated with the policy-rule recommendation.
25
Are rule recommendations less uncertain for alternative measures of
economic activity?
The first section discussed several ways of measuring economic
activity—the output gap, the unemployment gap, and the deviation of
real GDP growth from potential growth. For which of these alternative
measures do data revisions have the smallest effect on policy rule rec-
ommendations? To answer this question, Table 4 compares the range of
policy recommendations based on the output gap as the measure of
economic activity (the baseline case shown in Chart 4) with the range
of policy recommendations based on the other measures of activity. 
Even though revisions to the unemployment gap are considerably
smaller than those to the output gap, only small reductions in uncer-
tainty about policy-rule recommendations are obtained. Uncertainty
reductions are smaller because policy responses to unemployment gaps
would be larger than those to output gaps. Results for the unemploy-
ment gap are for a rule in which the weight on the unemployment gap
is three times larger than the weight on the output gap and the opposite
sign (-11/2 instead of 1/2). The factor of three comes from an assumption
of a coefficient of three in Okun’s law that relates the deviation of
output growth from potential growth to changes in the unemployment
rate (Orphanides 2002). A negative weight is used to reﬂect the nega-
tive business cycle correlation between the output gap and the
unemployment gap. In particular, a positive unemployment gap is
similar to a negative output gap in that both signal disinﬂationary pres-
sures, and vice versa.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2004 21
The third measure of economic activity examined is the deviation of
real GDP growth over the prior four quarters from potential growth over
the same period. When the weights on the real GDP growth deviation
and inﬂation are equal, this implementation of the rule corresponds to a
nominal growth targeting rule. Because nominal GDP growth is equal
to real GDP growth plus GDP price inﬂation, when the weights in the
policy rule on economic activity and inﬂation are equal as they are here,
the policy rule can be rewritten as:
(2)
where the nominal target is equal to the sum of potential real GDP
growth and the inﬂation target. This policy rule implementation exhibits
a modest reduction in uncertainty compared with the recommendations
based on the output gap (Table 4). If the nominal target is deﬁned as a
constant, then additional reductions in uncertainty are obtained.
26
Recommendations that policy be set according to nominal growth
targets are not new. Hall recognized the difﬁculties of setting policy
when the economy is undergoing structural change and potential
output is particularly challenging to estimate. He recommended setting
funds rate = eq real rate + inflation +    
1
2
–    (nominal GDP growth –(nominal target)), 
Table 4
THE RANGE OF RULE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
DIFFERENT MEASURES OF ACTIVITY
Measure of activity Average Minimum Maximum
Panel A: 1987Q4 – 1990Q4
Output gap 1.86 1.20 2.97
Unemployment gap 1.67 .69 2.53
Real GDP growth – potential growth 1.72 1.04 2.47
Nominal GDP growth  1.44 .96 2.34
with a constant nominal target
Panel B: 1987Q4 – 2001Q4
Output gap 1.85 .02 3.55
Unemployment gap 1.73 .19 3.47
Real GDP growth – potential growth 1.61 .24 2.89
Nominal GDP growth  1.55 .31 2.79
with a constant nominal target22 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
monetary policy to keep nominal GDP on a prescribed growth path. A
selection of other studies that examine forms of nominal output target-
ing include Gordon, Tobin, Taylor (1985), McCallum, McCallum and
Nelson, and Orphanides (2003).
Overall, while the evidence suggests measurements of economic
activity other than the output gap may imply less uncertainty for policy
rule recommendations, the improvements are not large. One caveat to
the results is that the properties of the uncertainty bands summarized in
Table 4 are clearly sensitive to assumed values for parameters of the
policy rule and uncertainty associated with other variables in the rule. 
How important are revisions to estimates of the equilibrium real rate?
Taylor’s original speciﬁcation assumed that the equilibrium real rate
was a constant (equal to 2 percent). In fact, it is not uncommon for
policy rules to assume that the equilibrium real rate does not vary over
time. However, with empirical evidence that the trend rate of growth of
productivity increased in the mid-1990s, policymakers acknowledged
that real interest rates would have to increase (Meyer, Greenspan,
Poole). Recent empirical analysis supports a close link between the
trend growth rate and the equilibrium real rate (Laubach and
Williams). Thus, it is important that policy rules account for time vari-
ation in the equilibrium real rate.
To assess the economic signiﬁcance of revisions to time-varying esti-
mates of the equilibrium real rate, policy rule recommendations based
on time-varying estimates are compared with recommendations based
on constant estimates. Constant estimates are set equal to the average of
the real funds rate, deﬁned as the difference between the nominal funds
rate and inﬂation over 1962-90, a sample for which data are available
for all vintages. Constant estimates will differ across vintages due to
revisions to inﬂation. Similar results are obtained if the equilibrium real
rate is replaced by a constant equal to 2 as in Taylor’s original speciﬁca-
tion. The difference between the range based on time-varying estimates
and the range with constant estimates provides an assessment of the
marginal sensitivity of funds rate recommendations to equilibrium real
rate measurement uncertainty.
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Revisions to estimates of the equilibrium real rate lead to economi-
cally important differences in Taylor rule recommendations (Table 5). A
comparison of the average range for the time-varying equilibrium real rate
to those for the constant estimates reveals that the marginal sensitivity of
Taylor rule recommendations is quite sizable—on the order of 45 to 85
basis points. This result is important because many studies that examine
how to conduct monetary policy in the presence of data uncertainty focus
on difﬁculties associated with estimating potential output and the output
gap and assume the equilibrium real rate is known and constant. 
A naïve interpretation of Table 5 might lead an analyst to advocate
following a policy based on a constant and unrevised value for the equi-
librium real rate. This would be a risky policy, particularly since the
constant chosen is unlikely to equal the true unobserved equilibrium
real rate. The range of estimates in Table 5 is narrower for a constant
equilibrium real-rate implementation of the Taylor rule only because,
for illustrative purposes, most of the uncertainty about one of the vari-
ables has been excluded.   
What do data revisions imply for appropriate weights in the Taylor rule?
Taylor (1999) suggested that policy recommendations from a rule
with a higher weight on the output gap would be preferred by a central
bank with a stronger aversion to output variability. While Taylor’s sug-
gestion was that the weight on the output gap be doubled from 0.5 as
Table 5
IMPLICATIONS OF TIME-VARYING ESTIMATES OF THE
EQUILIBRIUM REAL RATE FOR THE RANGE OF RULE
RECOMMENDATIONS
Estimate of equilibrium real rate Average Minimum Maximum
Panel A: 1987Q4 – 1990Q4
Time-varying 1.86 1.20 2.97
Constant 1.40 .79 2.30
Panel B: 1987Q4 – 2001Q4
Time-varying 1.87 .02 3.55
Constant 1.04 .07 2.6624 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
in his original 1993 speciﬁcation to 1, even this larger degree of respon-
siveness falls short of that suggested by some analysts (Rudebusch and
Svensson). Table 6 summarizes the sensitivity of policy rule recommen-
dations to data revisions when the weight on economic activity is
doubled (to 1). Results are reported for economic activity measured
using the output gap, although similar results would be obtained for
other measures of economic activity. 
Not surprisingly, Taylor rule recommendations based on a unit
weight on the output gap cover a broader range than those based on a
weight of 0.5 on the output gap. The larger range obtains because a
larger weight is put on a variable measured with considerable uncer-
tainty, in this case, the output gap. The larger range might be interpreted
as a warning to policymakers that policy actions that respond more
aggressively to economic variables such as the output gap, which are
subject to larger degrees of revision, are more likely to be viewed in hind-
sight as a mistake.   
Does gradual adjustment to the policy rule recommendation reduce
uncertainty?
Some analysts have argued that gradual adjustment of the federal
funds rate may be desirable in the presence of uncertainties about the
structure of the economy (English, Nelson, and Sack; Amato and
Laubach).
28To assess the implications of gradual policy in the presence of
Table 6
IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENT WEIGHTS ON
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY FOR THE RANGE OF RULE
RECOMMENDATIONS
Weight on the output gap Average Minimum Maximum
Panel A: 1987Q4 – 1990Q4
Weight = 0.5 1.86 1.20 2.97
Weight = 1.0 2.41 1.47 3.88
Panel B: 1987Q4 – 2001Q4
Weight = 0.5 1.87 .02 3.55
Weight = 1.0 2.27 .27 4.58ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2004 25
data revisions, policy recommendations are modiﬁed so that the funds
rate is only adjusted by a fraction of the rate change recommended by
the policy rule: 
(3)
where λ is a fraction between 0 and 1. This speciﬁcation captures grad-
ualism in policy actions by making adjustments to the federal funds rate
in response to changes in economic conditions more sluggish.    
Table 7 provides summary statistics on the degree of uncertainty,
assuming the funds rate is only adjusted by 25 percent of the recom-
mended change, that is, λ = 0.25.
29This weight is in line with empirical
estimates (Kozicki; Sack and Wieland). Gradualism reduces the effect of
uncertainty on policy recommendations but does not eliminate it. The
range of policy recommendations is narrower on average when based on
a gradualist policy. 
IV. REDUCING POLICY SENSITIVITY TO DATA
UNCERTAINTY 
The analysis of the previous section revealed that in the face of data
revisions, after-the-fact reviews of policy actions may ﬁnd considerable
fault with past decisions, in the sense that policy actions taken based on
best available data may be viewed as less appropriate after the data are
Table 7
IMPLICATIONS FOR RULE RECOMMENDATIONS OF
GRADUAL ADJUSTMENT
Average Minimum Maximum
Panel A: 1987Q4 – 1990Q4
No gradualism 1.86 1.20 2.97
Gradualism 1.06 .43 1.93
Panel B: 1987Q4 – 2001Q4
No gradualism 1.87 .02 3.55
Gradualism 1.59 .14 2.50
new funds rate = old funds rate +    
λ (policy rule recommendation – old funds rate)26 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
revised. Furthermore, real-time policy rule recommendations are
subject to considerable uncertainty. This section will review the
strengths and weaknesses of two proposals that attempt to minimize the
complications of data revisions when setting monetary policy.
Let policy be guided by measures of activity that are revised less
While most economic data series are revised, they are revised to dif-
ferent extents. With differences in the size of revisions, policymakers
may be better off conditioning their policy decisions on data series that
are less subject to revision. Care must be taken in applying this proposal
because data that are revised less do not necessarily provide a better
measure of the true underlying economic variable, and smaller revisions
do not always reduce uncertainty about policy rule recommendations or
limit incidents of inappropriate policy action.
The fact that data are not revised does not imply that the initial
release of a data point provides the best estimate of the true value. For
example, over time, methodological improvements may be developed to
bring measurements closer to the true underlying economic concept.
Some agencies may want to ensure that all observations are as accurate as
possible according to the latest available technology. This requires not
just using the new methodologies to produce future observations, but
substantial effort to revise historical data according to the new method-
ology. However, historical revisions can have complicated implications,
depending on how the data are used. For instance, if wages or other
nominal payments were indexed to a price index subject to historical
revisions, then what would be the appropriate response to revisions to
the price index that rewrite its history? Would employees be responsible
for repaying wages should the price index be revised down? In some cases
it may be preferable not to revise data. There is a presumption in BLS
policy and practice against revisions to the nonseasonally adjusted CPI
that extends back over lengthy periods. However, to satisfy demands for
a methodologically consistent price index, the BLS now publishes an
estimate of the CPI, known as the CPI research series using current
methods, that incorporates most of the improvements made historically. ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2004 27
The size of the revisions also may be misleading because smaller
revisions do not always translate into reduced policy rate uncertainty.
Average revisions to the unemployment gap are about a third of the size
of average revisions to the output gap (Table 3). However, because
policy rules generally recommend larger responses to unemployment
gaps than to output gaps, the advantages of the smaller revisions associ-
ated with the unemployment gap are largely negated (Table 4).
Nevertheless, in some situations policymakers might want to focus
their attention on data subject to smaller revisions. Revisions to the devi-
ation of output growth from potential growth tend to be smaller than
revisions to estimates of the output gap or the unemployment gap, and
this advantage carries over to policy rule recommendations. Uncertainty
surrounding policy rule recommendations based on nominal GDP
growth tend to be smaller than implementations that use other measures
of activity. But, nominal growth targeting does not totally escape difﬁ-
culties associated with data revisions. As estimates of potential growth
change with historical data revisions, nominal growth targeting requires
either an adjustment of the real potential growth component of the
nominal target or, in the constant-target case, recognition that the
implicit price-inﬂation target must be revised in the opposite direction to
balance the change in real potential growth.
The evidence on nominal income growth targeting is mixed.
Orphanides (2003) finds that in the presence of data uncertainty,
nominal income growth targeting is preferable to an output-gap-based
policy rule. Rudebusch generally supports the logic of nominal growth
targeting, but he ﬁnds that optimized output-gap-based rules tend to be
preferable to optimized nominal income growth targeting rules.
Ultimately, no high-quality data series appear to be sufficiently
precise and timely to justify not considering data subject to revision.
Thus, the relevant question is how policymakers can reduce the impli-
cations of data revisions for policy. 
Respond less to more uncertain data
Several analysts have used models of the U.S. economy to evaluate
how policymakers should respond to data series that are subject to revi-
sion. They found that uncertainty in the measurement of the output28 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
gap on the order of that found in comparisons of real-time estimates of
the output gap to latest available data brings a substantial deterioration
in economic performance (Orphanides, Porter, and others; Orphanides
2003). When properly taking account of uncertainty, policy should
respond more cautiously to apparent imbalances in economic activity
(Swanson; Svensson and Woodford; Smets; Tetlow; Orphanides 2003;
Rudebusch; Wieland). In a policy rule framework, this translates to a
lower weight on the output gap. In related work, Meyer, Swanson, and
Wieland studied policy rules based on unemployment gaps instead of
output gaps. They recommend that, during periods of heightened
uncertainty about the NAIRU, policymakers should lessen their
response to changes in the observed unemployment rate.
While analysts generally agree that policy responses to economic
imbalances should be smaller when their measurements are more uncer-
tain, there is less agreement on the absolute size of the appropriate
response. In general, most analysts ﬁnd that, in the absence of uncer-
tainty, policy should respond more aggressively to the output gap and
inﬂation than estimates of historical policy suggest has been the case.
Thus, a “less aggressive” response to an uncertain measure could still
imply a more aggressive response than historically. For example, Rude-
busch ﬁnds that, for plausible estimates of the degree of uncertainty in
the output gap, optimal monetary policy should respond more aggres-
sively to the output gap (with a weight of 1 to 11/2) than in the standard
Taylor rule. However, other analysts suggest that problems associated
with measuring the level of potential output are sufﬁciently severe that
alternative policies that avoid reacting to the level of the output gap
would be preferred (Orphanides 2003). Policy gradualism is an alterna-
tive approach to down-weighting new information that may be noisy.
By recommending that policy only partially adjust to the new data, the
emphasis on the uncertain data is reduced. Rather than reduce the
weight on a given variable in the policy rule, policy gradualism implic-
itly reduces the response weight to all variables on which the policy
recommendation depends. Several analysts argue for more gradual
responses in the presence of uncertainty (Orphanides, Porter, and
others; English, Nelson, and Sack; Amato and Laubach).  ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2004 29
Orphanides and Williams ﬁnd that a simple and effective approach
for dealing with ignorance about the degree of uncertainty in estimates
of the NAIRU and equilibrium real interest rate is to set policy so that
the change in the federal funds rate depends on changes in inﬂation and
changes in the unemployment gap. Walsh argues for a similar set up but
with the change in the output gap replacing the change in the unem-
ployment gap. Such rules do not require knowledge of the level of
potential output, the NAIRU, or the equilibrium real rate for setting
policy and consequently are immune to likely misperceptions in these
concepts. However, results tend to be speciﬁc to the model used. 
In general, rules that provide recommendations for the change in
the level of the funds rate tend to perform very poorly in models where
expectations depend on recent and past data (adaptive expectations) but
relatively well in forward-looking models. Overall, there appear to be
economic costs associated with completely ignoring the estimated levels
of the output gap or unemployment gap and the equilibrium real inter-
est rate, even when uncertainty regarding these variables is high.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This article highlighted some of the difficulties associated with
conducting monetary policy with data uncertainty. When historical
policy actions are reexamined using revised data, past decisions may
appear to be excessively accommodative or excessively restrictive.
When setting current policy, data revisions imply uncertainty about
the appropriate target level for the federal funds rate. Unfortunately,
while some approaches hold promise for reducing the likelihood of
policy regret, it is not possible to totally eliminate the difﬁculties asso-
ciated with data uncertainty. 
To reduce instances of policy regret, it may be desirable to make
policy actions less sensitive to highly uncertain data. Some approaches
that hold promise include responding to data averaged over several
quarters, setting policy based on measures of activity that are less uncer-
tain, and reducing the responsiveness of policy to noisy information. 30 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
APPENDIX
ESTIMATING THE EQUILIBRIUM REAL RATE
The equilibrium real rate is estimated following an empirical frame-
work similar to Laubach and Williams (LW). Output gap dynamics are
modeled using a simple reduced-form equation as in Rudebusch and
Svensson: 
where ~ yt is the output gap, rt is the real federal funds rate, and εy,t is a
shock term. For yt equal to the logarithm of real GDP and yt* equal to
the logarithm of potential real GDP, the output gap is deﬁned as ~ yt =
100 x( yt - yt*). The unobserved equilibrium real rate, r* t, is assumed to
follow a random walk process:
where εr,t is a shock. The terms εy,t and εr,t are assumed to be serially
uncorrelated and contemporaneously uncorrelated innovations with
variances σy
2 and σr
2, respectively. The ﬁrst equation deﬁnes the meas-
urement equation of a state-space model and the second deﬁnes the
transition equation. 
The speciﬁcation differs from that in LW along several dimensions.
One difference is that LW included a Phillips curve equation in which
inflation depends on the output gap and a transition equation for
potential GDP. The equilibrium real rate process and a series for poten-
tial output were jointly estimated. In the analysis of this article, CBO
estimates of potential output were used for yt*, so the only unobserved
state variable to be estimated is r* t. Second, LW assumed that the equi-
librium real rate is a linear function of potential growth and an
unobserved stochastic process, whereas here the link to potential growth
is not explicitly modeled. This choice was made because the growth rate
of CBO estimates of potential output was much more volatile than the
estimated potential growth series of LW, and explicitly modeling the
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link led to excessively volatile estimates of the equilibrium real rate.
Third, LW considered several variations on their speciﬁcation of the
unobserved stochastic process, leading to multiple series of estimates of
the equilibrium real rate. Here, one series is estimated and it is cali-
brated so that shocks to the equilibrium real rate are of the same
variance as in the LW baseline random walk speciﬁcation. Fourth, LW
separately included core import price inﬂation and crude imported oil
price inﬂation. Here, these effects are included in a single term—import
price inﬂation. 
Table A-1
Data Vintage Σay ar σ(~ y )
1991Q1 .90 -.13 .84
(.04) (.03)
1992Q1 .90 -.14 .84
(.04) (.04)
1993Q1 .91 -.14 .81
(.03) (.03)
1994Q1 .90 -.13 .80
(.03) (.03)
1995Q1 .90 -.13 .79
(.03) (.03)
1996Q1 .90 -.10 .82
(.04) (.03)
1997Q1 .90 -.11 .81
(.03) (.03)
1998Q1 .91 -.10 .80
(.03) (.03)
1999Q1 .91 -.08 .80
(.03) (.03)
2000Q1 .92 -.09 .77
(.03) (.03)
2001Q1 .91 -.09 .77
(.03) (.02)
2002Q1 .91 -.08 .78
(.03) (.02)
2003Q1 .92 -.08 .77
(.03) (.02)32 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Finally, LW used different measures of inﬂation and the real federal
funds rate than were chosen here. In this article, historical estimates of
the equilibrium real rate are constructed for different vintages of data.
Since revisions to real potential output and the GDP price index tend
to be related to revisions to real GDP, it seemed appropriate to use the
GDP price index to measure inﬂation rather than the core CPI as was
chosen by LW. To be consistent, the real federal funds rate was also con-
structed using GDP price inﬂation rather than core CPI inﬂation. The
analysis in this article deﬁned the real federal funds rate to be the differ-
ence between the quarterly average federal funds rate and quarterly
inﬂation. By contrast, LW constructed an estimate of the ex ante real
rate using a proxy for expected inﬂation based on the forecast of the
four-quarter-ahead percent change in the price index for personal con-
sumption expenditures excluding food and energy (core PCE prices)
from an AR(3) model of inﬂation estimated over the prior 40 quarters.
Kalman filter techniques are applied to the model. During
maximum likelihood estimation, the variance of εr,t is restricted to
equal (0.34)2 = 0.1156, corresponding to the variance of the shock to
the equilibrium rate in the baseline random walk case of LW. Smoothed
estimates of the unobserved state variable were taken as estimates of the
equilibrium real rate. Although, as shown in Chart 3, estimates of the
equilibrium real rate differenced considerably across vintages, other
details of the estimation were quite similar. Coefﬁcient estimates are
provided in Table A-1 for the 13 data vintages. The output gap exhibits
considerable persistence and responds negatively to deviations of the
real federal funds rate from the equilibrium real rate. ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2004 33
ENDNOTES
1While the Federal Reserve has long-run goals of price stability and sustain-
able economic growth, it does not have an explicit numerical target for inﬂation.
2The difference between observable data and other economic concepts may
seem to be difﬁcult to distinguish—particularly since the estimates of unobserv-
able concepts such as potential output and the natural rate of unemployment are
published by a government agency, the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (CBO). In
this respect, one way to distinguish between observable data and estimates of
unobservable concepts is to consider what series analysts use. Analysts tend to use
observable data as published by the government. However, some analysts prefer
to use their own estimates of unobservables rather than those published by, say,
the CBO.
3The data series are meant to be a representative, but not exclusive, list of the
economic variables typically encountered in studies on the conduct of monetary
policy.
4For example, real GDP growth for the ﬁrst quarter of 1977 was ﬁrst pub-
lished to be 5.2 percent (seasonally adjusted annual rate) in the advance release of
April 1977, but was subsequently revised to 7.5, 7.3, 8.9, 9.6, 8.9, 5.6, 6.0, 5.3,
4.9, and 5.0 percent later in 1977, and then in 1978, 1979, 1980, 1982, 1986,
1991, 1996, 1997, and 2000, respectively (Croushore and Stark 2000). In this
example, April 1977 is the vintage of the advance release and the years label ten
subsequent vintages of real GDP growth for the ﬁrst quarter of 1977.
5For example, even if all observations after the ﬁrst quarter of 1977 were
excluded, a dataset constructed from the latest available vintage of data would
incorporate revisions to historical data for observations before the ﬁrst quarter of
1977 that would not have been available in April 1977.
6For notational simplicity, the vintages will be referred to by the year of the
vintage only. 
7For each vintage of CBO data, remaining data from the Real-Time Dataset
for Macroeconomists was taken from the same quarter’s vintage dataset.  This
timing only approximately reconciles the timing of available information from
the two data sources.  The ﬁrst-quarter vintage data from the Real-Time Dataset
for Macroeconomists includes the advance estimates of the National Income and
Products Accounts data for the fourth quarter.  However, while both the advance
estimates of National Income and Products Accounts data for the fourth quarter
and the CBO data are published in the ﬁrst quarter, the advance release of fourth
quarter data is published after the CBO data and would not have been available
when the CBO data were constructed. 
8Judd and Rudebusch estimated Taylor rules for samples distinguished by the
chairman of the Federal Reserve and found their framework successfully captured
differences in policy regime across chairmen.
9The output gap was constructed as 100*log(GDP(t)/potential GDP(t)).
10Orphanides (2003) found that revisions to estimates of potential GDP used
by staff at the Federal Reserve Board were the major contributor to revisions to
Board staff estimates of the output gap.
11The CBO estimates potential GDP as part of their budget projection
efforts. Details on their estimation methodology are provided in CBO (2001).34 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
12The average range may understate the degree of uncertainty because fewer
vintages of data are available for recent observations as these data have been sub-
ject to fewer revisions. In fact, only two vintages of data are available for 2001.
The minimum range may appear very low for the same reason.
13Orphanides studied different estimates of the output gap than those exam-
ined here. His analysis was based on estimates of potential output used by staff at
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. 
14Starting with the 1995-vintage data, NAIRU estimates derive from an
econometric estimate of a Phillips curve that relates the change in inﬂation to the
deviation of the unemployment rate from the NAIRU and other factors such as
productivity growth, oil price shocks, and wage and price controls (CBO 1994
and 2001).
151991-vintage data are real GNP rather than real GDP. Annualized values of
quarterly growth rates are calculated as 400*log(real GDP (t) / real GDP (t-1)).
16When a longer history of vintages is examined, differences across vintages
can be considerably larger than reported in the table (Croushore and Stark 2000
and 2001).
17Mankiw and Shapiro provide an analysis of the properties of GNP revi-
sions. Although they ﬁnd that the magnitude of revisions to GNP growth are
quite large, they conclude that at the time of each revision the new ﬁgure is gen-
erally the best available estimate of the ﬁnal value.
181991-vintage data are GNP price inﬂation rather than GDP price inﬂation.
19Annualized values of quarterly inﬂation rates are calculated as 400*log(price
index (t)/price index(t-1)).
20Occasional revisions are made to correct reporting errors or software errors
(Bureau of Labor Statistics). In September 2000, the BLS revised nonseasonally
adjusted CPI data for the January to August 2000 period to correct the implica-
tions of a software error. During the 1990s, revisions were made only seven times,
generally to correct reporting errors. However, none of these corrections led to
any revision of the All Items index at the U.S. level.
21Since there is presumption in BLS policy and practice against revisions to
the nonseasonally adjusted CPI that extend back over lengthy periods, changes to
correct the errors have to be large enough to warrant republication.
22Revisions to estimates of potential output and the NAIRU are also driven
by the same two factors. However, more information than a history of vintages of
the ﬁnal estimates is required to determine the sizes of the relative contributions
of each factor to these series. 
23This article focuses on the sensitivities of  rule recommendations to data revi-
sions. Kozicki  showed that Taylor rule recommendations are sensitive to how inﬂa-
tion and the output gap are measured, to estimates of the equilibrium real rate, and
to other details of the rules speciﬁcation. That article did not discuss issues related
to data revisions and only latest available versions of data were examined.
24Funds rate recommendations in a given quarter are based on data from the
previous quarter to account for time lags in the real-time availability of data.
25Uncertainty linked to data revisions is only one source of uncertainty affect-
ing policy decisions. Accounting for other sources of uncertainty, such as what
measure of inﬂation should be the focus of monetary policy, what methodologyECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2004 35
should be used to estimate potential GDP and/or the output gap, and what
weights should be placed on the output gap and inﬂation, would lead to a wider
range of funds rate recommendations (Kozicki).
26In Table 4, entries labeled “Nominal GDP growth with a constant nominal
target,” the nominal target is deﬁned as the sum of a constant inﬂation target set
to 2 percent and average real GDP growth over 1960-90.
27Although revisions to estimates of the equilibrium real rate are mapped
one-for-one to funds rate recommendations, the marginal difference may be
smaller than the uncertainty summarized in Table 3 if revisions to estimates of the
equilibrium real rate are correlated with revisions to the output gap, potential
growth, or inﬂation.
28In addition, English, Nelson, and Sack suggest that gradualism may reduce
volatility in ﬁnancial markets and may increase the economic responses to policy
actions by magnifying the response of other market interest rates to policy actions.
29The results in the table take the funds rate in 1987Q3 as a starting point
and then construct policy settings recursively. A different recommendation is
obtained than if the funds rate is set as a linear combination of (1-λ) multiplied
by the actual funds rate in the previous quarter and λ multiplied by the recom-
mendation of the policy rule recommendation. 36 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
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